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Abstract 
 
The authors review the recent literature on crime and violence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and present a broad overview of the main ideas and empirical findings. They 
provide estimates of the magnitude of the problem, trends, and the manifestations of 
crime and violence in Latin America. They also discuss the ways in which violence 
affects development, the root causes of violence and the empirical evidence on the 
determinants of crime. The authors conclude by stressing that preventive measures and 
innovative social policies are efficient and under-utilized strategies to address the 
problem and call for both more research and operational experimentation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With more than 140,000 homicide deaths per year, Latin America’s homicide rate is 
twice the world’s average, making it the most violent region in the world after Sub-
Saharan Africa.
2 Selected indicators such as homicide rates, injury rates, and the size of 
the private security sector would suggest that some countries in the region exhibit war-
like symptoms, despite being formally at peace. Alarmingly, crime and violence levels 
have been on the rise since the 1970s. The Pan-American Health Organization has 
described violence as the regional pandemic. Every year, Latin Americans lose an 
average of 3 days of good health due to violence and 28 million families are subject to 
robbery and theft.
3  
 
In Latin America, violence disproportionately affects the poor, eroding their assets and 
livelihoods. The abnormally high levels of crime and violence constitute a key obstacle to 
the development of the region. The cost associated with these levels of crime and 
violence is astounding: it is estimated at 14.2% of the regional GDP.
4 In terms of human 
capital, 1.9% of GDP is lost annually, which is equivalent to the region’s spending on 
primary education. Over the past 15 years, the net accumulation of human capital has 
been cut in half due to the increase in crime and violence.
5 According to the Colombian 
National Planning Department, the cost of violence (including urban violence and armed 
conflict) amounted to 18.5% of GDP between 1991 and 1996.
6 The cumulative effect of 
“lost growth” as a result of crime and violence is such that Colombia would today have a 
per capita income on the order of 32% higher than at present.
7 
 
This paper surveys the recent literature on crime and violence and provides a broad 
overview of the main ideas and empirical findings. It does not attempt to be 
comprehensive, but it rather seeks to provide an introduction. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the magnitude, trends, and manifestations of crime and violence in Latin 
America. Section 3 discusses the ways in which violence impacts on development and 
offers some cost estimates. Section 4 surveys the literature on the root causes of violence 
and the empirical evidence on the determinants of crime. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
Additionally, the paper presents three annexes: (1) Data Sources on Crime and Violence 
for LAC, (2) Overview of Selected Papers on Crime and Violence in LAC, and (3) 
Overview of Selected Empirical Papers on Crime and Violence in LAC. 
                                                 
2 The World Health Organitzation’s “World Report on Violence and Health” (2002) estimates the homicide 
rate per 100,000 population at 19.3 for the Region of the Americas, including the United States and 
Canada.  
3 Londoño and Guerrero (2000).  
4 Ibid. 
5 Londoño (1996) quoted in Ayres (1998). 
6 Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1998) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
7 Rubio (2000).   3
2. Crime and Violence in Latin America: Magnitude, Trends, and Manifestations 
 
The extent to which countries in Latin America are affected by crime and violence varies 
significantly. For 1994, the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available, 
homicide rates per 100,000 were 51.9 in the Andean region, 30.1 in Brazil, 21.1 in 
Central America and the Hispanic Caribbean, 19.5 in Mexico (1995 data), 8.7 in the 
English Caribbean and 6.2 in the Southern Cone.
8 Crime and violence rates are especially 
high in post-conflict countries. In El Salvador, for example, the homicide rate increased 
by 36% after the end of the civil war.
9 But high levels of violence are not exclusively a 
symptom of countries experiencing or emerging from periods of political unrest. Rather, 
it appears that countries at varying levels of development are affected by it. 
 
Alarmingly, crime and violence levels have been on the rise since the 1970s. Data 
indicate an overall upward trend in criminal activity in most countries of the region, a few 
exceptions being Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica.
10 The highest rates of increase were 
recorded in the English Caribbean, where homicide rates jumped by more than 67% and 
in the Andean region, where rates more than doubled. In Brazil and Central America 
(including the Hispanic Caribbean), rates increased by 29.7% and 20.6%, respectively, 
whereas increases in the Southern Cone and Mexico were 14.8% and 7.1%. For the 
region as a whole, the non-population-weighted rate of increase was 40.7% between 1984 
and 1994, or approximately 3.4% per year.
11 One of the most dramatic increases occurred 
in Jamaica: between 1977 and 2000, the rate of violent crime increased from 254.6 
incidents per 100,000 to 633.4 per 100,000 and the murder rate jumped from 19.2 per 
100,000 to 39 per 100,000.
12 
 
Violence is most severe and visible in urban settings. The main metropolises such as Rio 
de Janeiro, Mexico City, Lima, and Caracas account for more than half the total of their 
national homicides.
13 While the majority of the literature analyzes crime and violence in 
urban contexts, large parts of the rural population are also affected by it. A high incidence 
of rural violence is most marked in conflict and post-conflict countries, such as in El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. El Salvador has one of the highest incidences of 
rural violence, with 76% of homicides occurring in rural areas.
14 Kay (2001) suggests 
that Latin America’s potential for rural violence is largely rooted in its unequal and 
exclusionary agrarian socioeconomic system, although the manifestation of violence 
depends on a number of factors, including particular political circumstances.
15 
 
Not only has there been a marked increase in crime and violence levels since the 1970s, 
but also a change in its form. Since the 1990s, the most visible manifestation of violence 
                                                 
8 Morrison, Buvinic, and Shifter (2003). 
9 Buvinic and Morrison (2000). 
10 Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (1998). 
11 Morrison, Buvinic, and Shifter (2003). 
12 Harriott (2004) in Harriott, Brathwaite and Wortley (2004). 
13 Briceño-León (1999) quoted in Moser (2004). 
14 World Vision (2002) quoted in Moser (2004). 
15 Kay (2001).   4
is no longer overt political conflict but instead crime and delinquency.
16 Violence is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon with a number of different manifestations: homicides, 
robberies, kidnappings, muggings, assaults, domestic violence, sexual violence, violence 
against children and the elderly, etc.
17 Victimization surveys demonstrate that different 
socio-economic groups experience violence differently: middle and high-income 
neighborhoods are mostly affected by property crime, whereas homicides and physical 
injuries are more common in low-income neighborhoods.
18 In a study of Colombia, 
Gaviria and Velez (2001) find that in the main metropolitan areas the rich households 
bear most of the burden of property crime, whereas the poor, especially the people with 
low educational attainment, bear a disproportionate burden of domestic violence.
19 The 
bulk of the data on homicides and injuries are not disaggregated by ethnic groups, but 
evidence on the local level indicates that those who suffer from social and cultural 
exclusion, such as indigenous groups and afro-descendants, are likely to be 
disproportionately affected by violence.
20 Ethnic and rural violence is especially 
pervasive in conflict settings. 
 
It is difficult to construct precise indicators in order to measure the magnitude of violence 
in its various forms and draw comparisons. As mentioned above, the most widespread 
measure is homicide rates, which is problematic, since it does not capture other, non-fatal 
types of violence and crime. Furthermore, homicide rates give a somewhat skewed 
picture of the crime situation, since the majority of crime tends to be property crime. 
Using homicides as a proxy for all violence will not yield an accurate picture. Another 
challenge is that homicide data are not always reliable and often includes unintentional 
deaths, such as car accidents. Furthermore, methodologies for violence indictors vary 
across countries and crimes suffer from severe underreporting, especially crimes such as 
domestic violence and the abuse of children and the elderly. Rubio (1998) estimates that 
only 15–30% of violent crimes are reported in Latin America.
21 Victimization surveys 
provide an excellent tool to form realistic estimates of the extent of crime and violence in 
the absence of reliable statistical data. These surveys demonstrate that underreporting is 
especially severe in poor areas. For similar levels of thefts, burglaries, and muggings, 
middle-class and rich neighborhoods have a much higher level of reporting than poorer 
areas.
22 The low level of reporting is partly explained by mistrust of the police in low-
income neighborhoods. Poorer areas also tend to display high levels of impunity. 
Criminals are often known and identified by shantytown dwellers, but an omerta of 
forced complicity protects them.
23 
                                                 
16 Rodgers (1999) in Moser and Lister (1999). 
17 The 2002 “World Report on Violence and Health” defines violence as the “intentional use of physical 
force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that 
either results in or has a high likelihood or resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment 
or deprivation.” Crime, on the other hand, is defined as an act punishable by law. While crime and violence 
are closely related to one another they are not interchangeable. There is non-violent crime as well as non-
criminal violence.  
18 See for instance Gaviria and Velez (2001). 
19 Gaviria and Velez (2001). 
20 Borjas (1995), Katzman (1999) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
21 Rubio (2000). 
22 Vanderschueren and Oviedo (1995) quoted in Vanderschueren (1996). 
23 Diagne (1995) quoted in Vanderschueren (1996).   5
 
Although violence tends to be discussed in terms of homicide rates, domestic violence is 
in fact among the most pervasive types of violence in Latin America, even if its visibility 
is low. Surveys undertaken by Heise, Ellsberg and Gottmoeller (1999) indicate that 
between 10% and 50% of women declared having been beaten or mistreated physically 
by their current or former partner.
24 In up to half of the cases, domestic violence goes 
hand in hand with psychological and sexual violence.
25 In Colombia, domestic violence 
affects almost half of the Colombian households while criminal victimization affects less 
than 10% of them.
26 The same study reveals that women from the bottom quintile of the 
income distribution are 15% more likely to suffer from domestic violence than women 
from the top quintile. The probability of being a victim of domestic violence rises as 
much as 10% from the top to the bottom quintile of the income distribution in urban 
Colombia. Empirical evidence suggests that the main risk factor for domestic violence is 
the lack of education: each year of schooling reduces the probability of domestic violence 
by more than 1%.
27 The costs of domestic violence go beyond the public health burden, 
as domestic violence affects the productivity and employability of women. Cost 
projections based on the estimated number of national victims, estimate the total cost to 
society from domestic violence at 1.6% of GDP for Nicaragua and at 2% of GDP for 
Chile.
28 
 
In contrast to domestic violence, youth violence is highly visible, whether in the form of 
gangs, in schools or on the streets. In Latin America, both the perpetrators and victims of 
violence are mostly young and male. In the Caribbean, an estimated 80% of violent 
crimes are committed by men, the majority of whom are under 35 years, with an 
increasing number under 14.
29 In 1995 in Rio de Janeiro, 91% of the city’s homicide 
victims were men and 57% were between the ages of 15 and 29.
30 
31 For the year 2000, 
the World Health Organization estimated the homicide rate for Latin American youth 
aged 10 – 29 at 36.4 per 100,000, more than double the African rate of 17.6.
32 However, 
there are substantial regional variations in youth homicide rates and youth homicides 
have not risen equally fast in all countries. Colombia shows the most severe increase, 
with rates rising 159% between 1985 and 1994, from 36.7 per 100,000 to 95 per 100,000. 
For the same period, Venezuela recorded an increase of 132% from 10.4 per 100,000 to 
24.1 per 100,000. In Mexico, youth homicide rates have been slightly more stable, rising 
from 14.7 per 100,000 to 15.6 per 100,000 for the period above.
33 Youth violence often 
occurs in the context of gangs. There are an estimated 30,000 – 35,000 gang members in 
El Salvador with a similar number in Honduras.
34 Gangs are a primarily male 
                                                 
24 Heise, Ellsberg, and Gottmoeller (1999) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison, and Orlando (2002). 
25 Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
26 Gaviria and Velez (2001). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Morrison and Orlando (1999) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
29 Gabriel and Bishop (1995) quoted in Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). 
30 Veija (1997) quoted in Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999). 
31 De Roux (1994) quoted in Ayres (1998). 
32 World Health Organization (2002). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.   6
phenomenon and members tend to come from economically deprived urban areas. Gangs 
tend to flourish in environments where the established social order has broken down and 
social capital is low.  
 
Youth violence is closely bound up with violence against children. There is a significant 
relationship between exposure to violence or victimization as a child and a later 
propensity for violent conduct.
35 It is estimated that 6 million minors in the region are the 
object of severe maltreatment and that 80,000 die each year as a result of injuries caused 
by their parents, relatives or others.
36 A recent study found that over 2 million children 
and youth, and 23 % of families experience abuse in urban Colombia, and that in Mexico 
City 1 million children and 13 % of households do so.
37 This study also finds that abuse 
has a significant negative effect on human capital: it affects on children’s educational 
attainment and adult labor wages. The public health literature makes a strong case for the 
prevention of violence against children and domestic violence as a form of primary 
violence prevention. 
 
With the rapid rise of crime and violence levels, citizen security has been identified as a 
key concern of the Latin American electorate. Latinobarómetro polls quote delinquency 
among the top concerns of the population along with unemployment, inflation, poverty 
and corruption.
38 The same poll reports low levels of inter-personal trust. Polls suggest 
that violence tolerance levels differ across societies and the perceptions of violence levels 
are not always matched by reality. Interestingly, Latin Americans seem to feel less secure 
than they actually are, according to research by Smulovitz (2004) on Argentina and 
Basombrío (2004) on Peru.
39 
                                                 
35 Dahlberg (1998) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
36 De Roux (1994) quoted in Ayres (1998). 
37 Knaul and Ramírez (2005). 
38 Latinobarómetro (2002) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
39 Smulovitz (2003), Basombrío (2003) in Frühling and Tulchin with Golding (2003).   7
3. Crime and Violence as a Development Problem 
 
The development literature began exploring the effects of crime and violence on 
development in the mid 1990s, and since, a number of scholars have convincingly argued 
that crime and violence are among the key obstacles for development in Latin America.
40 
Evidence shows that violence consistently undermines development efforts at various 
levels and that it drives the depreciation of all forms of capital, i.e. physical, human and 
social. Most importantly, violence disproportionately affects the poor and erodes their 
livelihoods and assets. As Moser (1996) argues, the more assets an individual or 
household can acquire and the better they manage them, the less vulnerable they are. 
Violence, however, severely hampers the poor’s ability to accumulate assets. The ways in 
which assets are affected by violence is detailed in the Table 1 below.  
 
The fact that children are heavily affected by violence is especially concerning, since 
childhood and adolescence are critical stages for the accumulation of these assets. The 
accumulation of youth’s human capital assets is severely restricted when violence limits 
their access to education and health care. The fewer assets an individual has, the more 
likely they are to turn to alternative means of survival (which often include violence), 
thereby perpetuating violence and the erosion of assets in households and communities.
41 
The effect violence has had on the accumulation of human capital is staggering: Londoño 
(1996) estimates that over the past 15 years the net accumulation of human capital in 
Latin America and the Caribbean has been cut in half due to the increase in crime and 
violence.
42 
 
 
Table 1. The Asset Vulnerability Framework and Violence 
 
Violence erodes: 
•  Labor as an asset when it limits access to jobs. 
•  Human Capital as an asset when it limits access to education and health facilities by 
both users and providers. 
•  Social Capital as an asset when it reduces trust and cooperation between community-
level social organizations. 
•  Household relations as an asset when it limits the capacity of households to function 
effectively as a unit. 
•  Productive assets when it destroys housing – the urban poor’s most important 
productive asset. 
 
Source: Moser (1996), (1998) quoted in Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999) 
 
A slightly different way of conceptualizing the effects of crime and violence on 
development – instead of focusing on an individual’s or a household’s assets – is to try 
and discern direct and indirect impacts on the economy as a result of violence and then 
attempt to estimate these as costs, e.g. the cost of policing or the cost of health services. 
                                                 
40 Ayers (1998), Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999), Morrison, Buvinic, and Shifter (2003). 
41 Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999). 
42 Londoño (1996) quoted in Ayres (1998).   8
Of course, not all expenditures can be treated as “costs” of violence since this disregards 
the need for some basic level of police, judicial and health spending, even in the absence 
of violence. The assumption is, however, that a high incidence of violence induces the 
population and policy-makers to divert resources from other, presumably more 
productive purposes, such as education.
43 This approach is useful in that it tries to 
illustrate the magnitude of the problem in monetary terms.  
 
Table 2 below provides a typology of costs that can arise from crime and violence. The 
direct costs include the impact on the health sector (the cost of injuries and deaths in 
terms of disability-adjusted life years), destruction of capital, cost of policing, judicial 
services and private security. It is estimated that countries in Latin America devote 
between 0.3% and 5% of GDP to treating the health consequences of violence and spend 
between 2% and 9% of GDP on providing judicial and police services.
44 In Colombia, 
public spending on security and criminal justice was 5% of GDP in 1996, private 
expenditures on security amounted to another 1.4% of GDP.
45 In a separate study, the 
Colombian National Planning Department estimated the costs of urban violence and 
armed conflict at 18.5% of GNP between 1991 and 1996. The loss of life has the largest 
share in this cost estimate with 43% of the total, followed by increased military spending 
with 30%, spending on security with 23%, terrorism with 3% and health with 1%.
46 In 
Venezuela, direct costs of violence are estimated to be 9% of GDP in terms of health and 
material losses for 1997.
47 Cruz and Romano (1997) estimate that spending of 
government institutions, legal costs, personal injuries and prevention activities amounted 
to more than 6% of GNP in El Salvador in 1995.
48 Since these figures arise from different 
methodologies, they are not strictly comparable with one another and are only intended to 
provide an indication of magnitudes. 
 
                                                 
43 Buvinic and Morrison (2000). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999). 
46 Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1998) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
47 Londoño and Guerrero (2000). 
48 Cruz and Romano (1997) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison, and Orlando (2002).   9
Table 2. Socioeconomic Costs of Violence: A Typology 
 
Direct monetary 
costs 
Value of goods and services used in treating or preventing violence: 
•  Police 
•  Criminal justice system 
•  Medical 
•  Psychological counseling 
•  Damage to physical infrastructure (housing, etc.) 
•  Social services 
Non-monetary costs  Pain and suffering: 
•  Increased morbidity 
•  Increased mortality via homicide and suicide 
•  Abuse of alcohol and drugs 
•  Depressive disorders 
Economic multiplier 
effects 
Macroeconomic, labor market, intergenerational productivity effects: 
•  Decreased labor market participation 
•  Reduced productivity on the job 
•  Lower earnings 
•  Increased absenteeism 
•  Intergenerational productivity impacts via grade repetition and 
lower educational attainment of children 
•  Decreased investment and savings 
•  Capital flight 
•  Decreased tourism 
•  Decreased government revenue 
•  Impact on policy-making by distorting government spending 
Social multiplier 
effects 
Impact on interpersonal relations and quality of life: 
•  Intergenerational transmission of violence 
•  Erosion of human capital 
•  Erosion of social capital and the social fabric 
•  Reduced quality of life 
•  Erosion of the state’s credibility 
•  Reduced participation in democratic processes 
Source: Adapted from Morrison, Buvinic and Shifter (2003). 
 
In addition to these direct costs, crime and violence have significant “multiplier” effects 
on the economy by depressing savings, investments, earnings, productivity, labor market 
participation, tourism, and ultimately growth. A recent study for Colombia suggests that 
for every additional 10 homicides per 100,000 residents, the level of investment falls by 
approximately 4%.
49 Put another way, if homicide rates in Colombia had remained 
unchanged since the 1960s, total annual investment in Colombia today would be around 
20% higher. Over time, violence and its costs can become nearly self-fulfilling, with 
violence leading to lower investment and a deteriorating economy, which in turn can 
unleash new bouts of aggression and crime. As mentioned in the introduction, a study on 
Colombia by Rubio (1996) concludes that the cumulative effect of “lost growth” as a 
result of crime and violence has been such that the country would today have a per capita 
                                                 
49 Buvinic and Morrison (2000).   10
income in the order of 32% higher than it currently has.
50 Schneidman (1998) estimates 
the reduction in average annual growth in Colombia at 2% over the past decade.
51 
 
Estimates of the total cost of violence are staggering. The total economic cost of violence 
for the city of Rio de Janeiro was projected at US$ 1 billion for 1993.
52 For Colombia 
estimates vary, ranging from 18.5% according to the National Planning Department, to 
more conservative estimates of 8.4% of GDP according to Londoño and Guerrero 
(2000).
53 The latter authors estimate that the figure is similarly high for Brazil, El 
Salvador, Mexico, and Peru.
54 Violence also has an impact on policy-making, since 
violence exacerbates the difficulties of collecting government revenue and distorts public 
spending.
55  
 
Although less easily quantifiable, the impact of violence on interpersonal relations and 
the quality of life is not to be underestimated. This includes the intergenerational 
transmission of violence, an erosion of social capital, reduced quality of life and 
diminished participation of population in democratic processes.
56 Some have argued that 
violence can have an important function in terms of catalyzing political and social 
change. While this may be the case, it remains certain that violence only becomes 
necessary as a way of initiating political and social change when efficient institutional 
channels for peaceful democratic participation are nonexistent. Democracy is intimately 
bound up with the question of violence because in theory it should offer protection from 
arbitrary abuse. A high incidence of violence, however, challenges the state’s monopoly 
of force and its responsibility to protect its citizens. In Latin America, the promise of 
reduced state violence has not always materialized and in many parts democratization has 
been accompanied by a continuation or even an increase in the use of force by the police 
and the military.
57 The democracies in the region have been described as “uncivil 
democracies” in which the political right to vote has been achieved but violence, 
impunity and weak or malfeasant judiciaries block the realization of civil rights.
58 
Collective insecurity has subjected democratic institutions in Latin America to new 
demands. Fruehling (1995) has argued that the political impact of social violence is very 
large within a regional context characterized by a weak democratic culture.
59 
                                                 
50 Rubio (1996) quoted in Ayres (1998). 
51 Schneidman (1998) quoted in Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999). 
52 Lewis and Carter (1997) quoted in Moser and Van Bronkhorst (1999). 
53 Londoño and Guerrero (2000). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Buvinic and Morrison (2000). 
56 Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
57 Pereira and Davis (2000). 
58 Holston and Caldeira (1998) quoted in Pereira and Davis (2000). 
59 Fruehling (1995) quoted in Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter (1999).   11
4. Causes and Determinants of Crime and Violence: Empirical Evidence 
 
A number of typologies exist to categorize different types of violence. The public health 
approach often systematizes violence according to characteristics of those committing the 
violent act, i.e. self-directed, interpersonal or collective violence.
60 Rozenthal (1998) 
suggests a division into “political, delinquency and interpersonal violence” and, in a 
similar vein, Chernick (1998) suggests “political, criminal and social violence”.
61 Moser 
and Shrader (1999) point out that these typologies lack conceptual congruency and 
propose the categories political, economic, and social violence, each identified in terms 
of the type of power that consciously or unconsciously violence is used to gain or 
maintain.
62 In a later paper the same author proposes political, institutional, economic, 
and social violence, each defined in terms of motivation for the physical act that 
consciously or unconsciously is used to gain power.
63 As these examples show, 
constructing clear-cut categories is difficult for such a multi-facetted phenomenon and 
most categories will overlap somewhat. The number of typologies also reflects the fact 
that the field is compartmentalized between different academic approaches, the dominant 
ones being public health and psychology.  
 
Public health specialists and psychologists have tended to focus their efforts on research 
into the root causes of violence. They emphasize that violent behavior is learned and that 
it is affected by biological and environmental factors alike. As already mentioned, there 
is a significant relationship between exposure to violence or victimization as a child and a 
later propensity for violent conduct. But in addition to that, violence is the result of a 
complex interplay of individual, relationship, social, cultural and environmental factors. 
The most widely used model to conceptualize the various influences on violence is the 
so-called ecological model (see figure below), which identifies four levels of influence on 
violent behavior. These are individual factors (such as biological and demographic 
factors, educational attainment, substance abuse, etc.), relationship factors (e.g. relations 
with peers, partners, family), community factors, (i.e. the context into which social 
relationships are embedded, such as schools and neighborhoods) and societal factors 
(such as cultural norms, such as norms that entrench male dominance or support the use 
of excessive force by police).
64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 World Health Organization (2002). 
61 Rozenthal (1998), Chernick (1998) quoted in Moser and Shrader (1999). 
62 Moser and Shrader (1999). 
63 Moser (2004). 
64 World Health Organization (2002).   12
Figure 1. Ecological Model for Understanding Violence 
 
 
 
Source: World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health (2002) 
 
 
Economists, on the other hand, have traditionally analyzed crime and violence in terms of 
expected benefits vs. expected punishment (or cost). Early work has focused on the 
incentives of potential criminals, concluding that the higher the return of criminal versus 
legal activities and the lower the probability of apprehension and incarceration, the higher 
the individuals’ propensity to commit a crime.
65 Empirical studies show that violence 
responds to changes in expected punishment, and that the variable is thus policy 
sensitive.
66 Evidence also suggests that the severity of sentences does not have a 
significant deterrent effect, but the probability of being caught and tried can have a 
significant impact.
67 Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998, 2000, 2002) have 
conducted extensive research on the economic determinants of crime in Latin America on 
which the section below draws heavily. 
 
Fajnzylber et al. find that income inequality, not income, is among the key factors 
motivating crime. Greater inequality is associated with higher intentional homicide and 
robbery rates, but the level of income per capita is not a significant determinant of 
national crime rates. Countries with more unequal income distribution tend to have 
higher crime rates than those with more egalitarian patterns of income distribution. Crime 
tends to decline as the poorest quintile receives higher shares of national income. Data 
suggest that changes in income distribution, rather than changes in absolute levels of 
poverty, are associated with changes in violent crime rates.
68 These findings provide an 
explanation for the abnormally high rates of crime and violence in Latin America. 
Growth in the region has tended to be exclusive rather than inclusive, preventing the poor 
from taking advantage of their most abundant asset, i.e. their labor.
69 Another study finds 
that a one-point rise in a country’s Gini coefficient is associated with nearly a one-point 
increase in its homicide rate.
70 However, the relationship between inequality and violence 
is not completely straightforward: some countries have seen decreasing income inequality 
accompanied by an increase in violence (measured in homicide rates) such as Brazil and 
                                                 
65 Becker (1968) 
66 Levitt (1994) quoted in Ehrlich (1996); Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando (2002). 
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Venezuela, or a decrease in homicide rates accompanied by an increase in income 
inequality (Costa Rica and Mexico).
71 Larger income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient is also correlated with an increased incidence of robberies, but not to the same 
extent as in the case of homicides.
72 As with the homicide regressions, level of per capita 
income is not robustly correlated with the robbery rate.
73 
 
Correlations between crime and violence and unemployment offer less conclusive results, 
and the exact relationship between the variables remains to be clarified in further 
research. Some analysts have concluded that there is no correlation between 
unemployment and crime and violence in Latin America. But as Ayres (1998) points out, 
the fact that there is no direct causality does not signify that the two issues are unrelated. 
Data clearly shows that violence is counter-cyclical: homicide rates rise in periods of low 
economic activity, suggesting that unemployment has some effect on crime.
74 A 
considerable body of evidence supports the notion that young men in particular respond 
to the economic returns of crime, and these returns will be perceived as larger if 
legitimate employment is scarce or non-existent. Thus there is an argument that 
unemployment is a factor motivating crime and violence in urban areas in Latin 
America.
75  
 
Regarding the effect of education, studies find that average years of schooling do not 
have a conclusive impact on crime and violence rates.
76 However, when the average 
years of schooling of the adult population is used as a proxy for the country’s educational 
attainment, education appears to have a significant crime reducing impact. The contrast 
of results obtained using secondary enrollment rates and average years of schooling may 
indicate that the efforts to educate the young may not reduce crime and violence levels 
immediately, but eventually lead to a significant reduction of crime, especially of the 
violent sort.
77 The level of educational attainment of the adult population also has a 
robbery-reducing impact.
78 As mentioned above, the lack of education is one of the main 
risk factors for domestic violence: each year of extra schooling reduces the probability of 
domestic violence by more than 1%.
79 
 
As mentioned in Section II, crime and violence in Latin America is a predominantly 
urban phenomenon. The significance of the correlation between urbanization and crime 
and violence is somewhat disputed in the literature. Buvinic and Morrison (2000) argue 
that crime rates in Latin America are strongly correlated with city size.
80 They suggest 
that crowding intensifies anti-social behavior and that transient populations cannot foster 
the level of social cohesion that tends to keep violence at bay. Furthermore, evidence 
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shows that urban growth is also negatively correlated with confidence levels in the police 
and the judiciary. Others point out that rapid and poorly-managed urbanization can 
trigger a dynamic of mutual reinforcement between increasing crime rates and crumbling 
law enforcement institutions.
81 Fajnzylber et al. find a weaker correlation between 
urbanization and the homicide rate, but a more significant one with the robbery rate.
82 
Thus robberies are likely related to population density and the social interactions that 
arise from it. A study on Colombian cities by Gaviria and Pages (1999) supports this 
conclusion, finding a strong correlation between crime and violence and a city’s growth 
rate.
83 Thus the authors suggest that a high incidence of crime and violence is to an 
important extent a reflection of many cities’ inability to keep up with an increasing 
demand for public safety brought by hasty and disorderly urbanization processes.  
 
Drug production and drug possession are both significantly associated with higher crime 
rates. Fajnzylber et al. find that the incidence of intentional homicide is statistically larger 
in countries that produce drugs.
84 This goes with the popular view that violent crimes 
increase with drug trafficking and consumption. It remains to be studied, however, 
whether the incidence of homicides in drug producing and/or consuming countries is 
directly affected by drug-related activities or is the result of crime externalities of these 
activities. The drug possession crime rate is also positively associated with the robbery 
rate.
85 
 
Econometric analysis has also shed some light on the phenomenon of criminal inertia, i.e. 
the persistence of crime over time. The regressions by Fajnzylber et al. reveal that crime 
and violence have an important inter-temporal dimension: current levels of violence 
influence future levels of violence. Current crime rates only respond to current policy 
variables with a significant lag.
86 The robbery rate also exhibits a significant degree of 
inertia, which is somewhat larger than that of the homicide rate. Sah (1991) points out 
that part of the problem may be that those living in areas with high crime participation 
rates can perceive a lower probability of apprehension than those living in areas with low 
crime participation rates, because the resources spent in apprehending each criminal tend 
to be low in high crime areas. Sah’s conclusion that past crime tends to breed future 
crime has important policy implications for violence prevention initiatives.
87 
 
Among the structural factors which contribute to the legitimization of violence are a 
country’s level of impunity and corruption, racism, perceived lack of justice, and its links 
to social exclusion.
88 As mentioned in Section II, the high levels of mistrust of the police 
work to protect the criminals and explain the low levels of criminal reporting. The 
effectiveness of the police hinges on its relationship with the judiciary, i.e. on the 
effectiveness of criminal justice. Access to justice is especially problematic for the poor 
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and for socially excluded minorities. Many see the high levels of impunity as one of the 
key reasons for the high violence levels in Latin America.
89 The world competitiveness 
report, which rates judicial systems of the world on the basis of efficiency and the 
opinions of users and public confidence, puts all Latin American judiciaries (except 
Chile) in the bottom 20%.
90 Perhaps not surprisingly, the lack of confidence in the 
administration of justice is most pronounced among low-income families and small 
economic units.
91 In Colombia an empirical study of the determinants of violence 
measured by the homicide rate, found that in the seven major cities the main explanation 
for the increase of violence in the 1980s was drug trafficking and to a lesser extent, the 
collapse of the judicial system.
92 
 
Finally, another significant risk factor for violent behavior is low social capital. Studies 
demonstrate that societies with low social capital are more susceptible to violence and 
data suggests that causality runs both ways.
93 Especially when the sense of trust among 
community members is taken as an indicator for social capital, regressions show a 
significant crime-reducing effect.
94 A study in Chicago showed that social cohesion 
among neighbors combined with a willingness to intervene on behalf of the common 
good is linked with a reduction in violence.
95 In a similar vain, Wilson and Kelling 
(1982) argue that disorder and urban decay are associated with crime and violence.
96 The 
presence of other types of violence in a society is also important, because it leads to a 
legitimization of violence to resolve any conflict. Countries such as Colombia, which 
experience high levels of political violence, also display a high level of tolerance for 
economic and social violence. One form of violence often feeds into others.  
 
The 1999 United Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice concludes that the 
socioeconomic strain – measured by unemployment, inequality, and dissatisfaction with 
income – is a major factor in explaining the variation in “contact crimes” among 
countries in the world.
97 There is a consensus in the literature that overall levels of 
development are less important in explaining violence than the extent of inequality, the 
levels of growth and the pre-existing level of violence.
98 Tackling inequality is key for 
violence prevention. The link between inequality and violence has important implications 
for the type of growth that is conducive to violence prevention. Growth that is not pro-
poor is unlikely to bring about a significant reduction in violence levels. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
There is a consensus in the literature that the explanation for the abnormally high level of 
violence is primarily due to the extent of inequality rather than the overall levels of 
development in Latin America. The fact that violence fundamentally hinges on inequality 
has important implications for the type of growth that needs to occur in order to achieve a 
reduction in crime and violence levels. Promoting pro-poor growth and equitable 
development to reduce the stark levels of inequality is key to curbing the violence 
pandemic. The main risk factors for violent and criminal behavior next to income 
inequality are the lack of education, low social capital, unemployment, unruly 
urbanization and inefficient criminal justice systems. Interventions should be geared 
towards the bottom quintile of the income distribution, attempting to reduce income 
inequality, ensure better access to education, jobs and justice, and build social capital. 
These preventive measures and innovative social policies are efficient and under-utilized 
strategies to address the problem. Violence prevention is inseparable from equitable 
development and social action. 
 
To enhance our understanding of how violence affects the poor, victimization needs to be 
analyzed in more detail, especially among marginalized ethnic and social groups, which 
are largely excluded from existing studies. Another pertinent question is how new local 
governance structures can contribute to a reduction in crime and violence.
99 There is an 
urgent need for both analytical work and operational experimentation. 
 
As a final note further research is suggested in three areas. Crime and violence research 
could benefit enormously from national data being updated annually and in a comparable 
fashion across countries. Moreover, evaluations of existing violence prevention programs 
are called for, and finally the literature could benefit greatly from a consistent model to 
calculate costs of crime and violence.  
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Annex 1: Data Sources on Crime and Violence for LAC 
 
United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 
Data sets from 5 surveys are available for 1970 – 1994. 
http://www.uncjin.org/stats/wcs.html 
 
International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI) 
Standardized sample surveys for households experience with crime, policing, crime prevention and feelings 
of safety for Argentina (1992 and 1996), Bolivia (1996), Brazil (1992 and 1996), Colombia (1997), Costa 
Rica (1992 and 1996) and Paraguay (1996). 
http://www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/data.php 
 
Instituto Latinoamericano de las Naciones Unidas para la Prevención del Delito y el Tratamiento del 
Delincuente (ILANUD) 
Various surveys on crime, delinquency, and victimization. 
http://www.ilanud.org.br/  
 
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) 
Regional Core Data Initiative in Health 
For the most recent country data on homicides and inter-personal injuries. 
http://www.paho.org/english/dd/ais/coredata.htm 
 
World Health Organization 
World Report on Violence and Health (2002) 
The statistical annex contains data for LAC countries for mortality caused by intentional injuries and 
homicides, disaggregated by age groups and gender, for the most recent year available between 1990 and 
2000. Data for firearm related deaths (homicides, suicides, unintentional and undetermined) is also 
available for the most recent year between 1990 and 2000. 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf 
 
Latinobarómetro 
Latinobarómetro conducts annual surveys in 18 Latin American countries. Questions on victimization are 
not specifically included, but they include perceptions of security, confidence in public institutions and 
basic health information. 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id=149 
 
United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_research.html 
 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica (INEI) 
A variety of surveys for Peru including household surveys, surveys on violence and public security and 
women’s issues. 
http://www.inei.gob.pe/web/BiblioInei/ListaItemByTemaPalabra.asp?c=4&tt=Sociales 
 
Brazil: Ministério da Saúde 
Various mortality indiactors. 
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/idb2004/matriz.htm 
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Annex 2: Overview of Selected Papers on Crime and Violence in LAC 
 
Authors  Countries Covered  Types of Violence Covered 
Ayres, Robert (1998) 
“Crime and Violence as 
Development Issues in Latin 
America and the Caribbean” 
LAC Region with examples 
including Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador and Peru 
Homicides, violence against 
women, youth violence 
Bourguignon, François (1999) 
“Crime, Violence and Inequitable 
Development” 
LAC Homicides,  robberies 
Buvinic, Morrison y Orlando 
(2002) 
“Violencia, crimen y desarrollo 
social en América Latina y el Caribe” 
LAC  Gender violence, ethnic violence, 
violence against the elderly and 
children, youth violence 
Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter 
(1999) 
“Violence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: A Framework for Action” 
LAC  Physical, social and psychological 
violence 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 
(2002) 
“What Causes Violent Crime?” 
45 countries  Homicides, robberies 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(2002) 
“Inequality and Violent Crime” 
39 countries  Homicides, robberies 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(2000) 
“Crime and Victimization: An 
Economic Perspective” 
45 countries  Homicides, robberies 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 
(1998) 
“Determinants of Crime Rates in 
Latin America and the World” 
LAC Homicides,  robberies 
Gaviria and Pagés (1999) 
“Patterns of Crime Victimization in 
Latin America” 
LAC Property  crime 
Gaviria and Velez (2001) 
“Who Bears the Burden of Crime in 
Colombia?” 
Colombia  Property crime, homicides, 
kidnappings and domestic violence 
Harriott (2004) 
The Jamaica Crime Problem: Some 
Policy Considerations” 
Jamaica  Property crimes, violent crimes 
Kay (2001) 
“Reflections on Rural Violence in 
Latin America” 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru,  
Rural violence 
Lederman, Loayza and Menéndez 
(2002) 
“Violent Crime: Does Social Capital 
Matter?” 
39 developed and developing 
countries 
Homicides 
Londoño and Guerrero (2002) 
“Violencia en América Latina: 
epidemiología y costos” 
Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 
Property crime, homicides, 
robberies, urban violence  
Morrison, Buvinic and Shifter 
(2004) 
“The Violent Americas: Risk 
Factors, Consequences and Policy 
LAC  Domestic violence, social violence, 
violence against women   24
Implications of Social and Domestic 
Violence” 
Morrison and May (1994) 
“Escape from Terror: Violence and 
Migration in Post-Revolutionary 
Guatemala” 
Guatemala Rural  violence, military/police 
violence 
Moser and Holland (1997) 
“Urban Poverty and Violence in 
Jamaica” 
Jamaica  Political violence, drug violence, 
gang violence, economic violence, 
interpersonal violence, domestic 
violence 
Moser and van Bronkhorst (1999) 
“Youth Violence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean” 
LAC, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago  Youth violence, gang violence  
Pereira and Davis (2000) 
“New Patterns of Militarized 
Violence and Coercion in the 
Americas” 
LAC, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru 
Military violence, police violence 
Piquet Carneiro (2000) 
“Violent Crime in Latin American 
Cities: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo” 
Brazil  Urban violence, police violence 
Rodgers (1999) 
“Youth Gangs and Violence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean” 
LAC, Nicaragua  Gang violence 
Vanderschueren (1996) 
“From Violence to Justice and 
Security in Cities” 
World, LAC, Brazil, Colombia  Urban violence 
World Bank (2003) 
“Caribbean Youth Development” 
Caribbean Region   Youth violence 
World Health Organization (2002) 
“World Report on Violence and 
Health” 
World, LAC  Youth violence, child abuse, 
domestic and sexual violence, 
violence against the elderly, 
collective violence 
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Annex 3: Overview of Selected Empirical Papers on Crime and Violence in LAC 
 
Authors and Title  Methodology  Data Sources 
Bourguignon, François (1999) 
“Crime, Violence and Inequitable 
Development” 
Cross-section and panel data 
analysis of the relationship 
between inequality, poverty and 
crime 
UN World Crime Surveys data on 
homicides and robberies for 
1970-94 for a large number of 
countries, including 26 countries 
in LAC; inequality data from 
Deininger and Squire (1996) for 
mid 1980s 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza (2002) 
“What Causes Violent Crime?” 
GMM estimations of panel data 
for economic determinants of 
crime and violence 
UN World Crime Surveys data on 
homicides and robberies for 
1970-94 for a large number of 
countries, including 26 countries 
in LAC 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza (2002) 
“Inequality and Violent Crime” 
Correlations between Gini index 
and homicides and robberies 
Panel data for 39 countries for 
1965-1995 for homicides and for 
37 countries (1970-1994) for 
robberies 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza (2000) 
“Crime and Victimization: An 
Economic Perspective” 
GMM estimations of panel-data 
for economic determinants of 
crime and violence 
Data from UN and WHO as well 
as various victimization surveys 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza (1998) 
“Determinants of Crime Rates in 
Latin America and the World” 
Cross-sectional and panel data 
analysis of determinants of 
national homicide and robbery 
rates  
UN World Crime Surveys data on 
homicides and robberies for 
1970-94 for a large number of 
countries, including 26 countries 
in LAC 
Gaviria and Pagés (1999) 
“Patterns of Crime Victimization 
in Latin America” 
Analysis of victimization for 
property crime in relation to 
socioeconomic status, city size 
and city growth effects 
Latinobarómetro data for 17 
countries in LAC from 1996 – 
1998 complemented by 
victimization surveys for 
Colombia (Encuesta Nacional de 
Calidad de vida), El Salvador 
(Londoño and Guerrero) and Peru 
(INEI) 
Gaviria and Velez (2001) 
“Who Bears the Burden of Crime 
in Colombia?” 
Probit estimations of the 
distribution of crime across 
victims, distribution of household 
investments in crime avoidance 
and distribution of domestic 
violence in Colombia 
Fedesarrollo Social Surveys 
(September 1999, April 2000 and 
September 2000) for 8 
Colombian cities; domestic 
violence data from National 
Survey of Demography and 
Health (ENDS) for 2000 
Lederman, Loayza and 
Menéndez (2002) 
“Violent Crime: Does Social 
Capital Matter?” 
GMM estimations of various 
social capital indicators on crime 
(measured by homicides) 
National data for 39 developed 
and developing countries for 
1980-94 and household surveys 
Londoño and Guerrero (2002) 
“Violencia en América Latina: 
epidemiología y costos” 
Cost estimates of crime and 
violence as a ratio of GDP based 
on authors’ surveys; cross section 
analysis of determinants of 
violence 
Victimization surveys/case 
studies conducted by the authors, 
ACTIVA household surveys, 
Propia survey, Latinobarómetro 
surveys 
Piquet Carneiro (2000) 
“Violent Crime in Latin 
American Cities: Rio de Janeiro 
Spatial and longitudinal trends 
analysis of criminal indicators; 
logistic analysis of victimization 
System of Mortality Information 
(SIM) from the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health; Occurrence   26
and São Paulo”  and different types of crime for 
different data sets; panel data 
analysis, fixed effect regressions  
Bulletins from the Brazilian 
Justice and Security Departments; 
Victimization surveys by PNAD, 
ACTIVA, ILANUD, ISER and 
the Determinants of Crime 
Project 
 
 